What Contributed to the Failed Mongol Invasions of Japan?
In the belatedly thirteenth century, the Mongol Empire under Kublai Khan made two unsuccessful attempts to invade Japan. Historian Kawai Atsushi gives the background to the invasion, examines different theories about reasons for its failure, and looks at the aftermath for both sides.
Emissaries Ignored
In November 1274, a fleet conveying some thirty,000 Mongol Empire troops approached Hakata Bay off the Japanese island of Kyūshū. Genghis Khan had established the empire in the early thirteenth century by unifying the nomadic peoples of the Mongolian Plateau. Successive leaders expanded the empire through fundamental Asia, and made Goryeo (Korea) a vassal country in 1259. At the time of the invasion, the Mongol holdings stretched from southwest asia and Russia to northern China and the Korean peninsula.
Seeking a southern base of operations, in 1264 Kublai Khan had moved the capital letter from Karakorum to the new metropolis of Khanbaliq (now within the modern metropolis of Beijing). Kublai, the fifth Mongol emperor and a grandson of Genghis Khan, then founded the Chinese Yuan Dynasty in 1271. Around this time, he was warring with the Southern Song Dynasty, which had its majuscule in Lin'an (at present Hangzhou). He sent emissaries to Nihon in an attempt to break its close trade ties with the Southern Song and reduce the latter's economic force.
Kublai'due south letter to Japan talked of how it had previously sent emissaries to China, but had not done so since his rise to power. He invited the country to send emissaries again and constitute friendly relations. It seems that at start he had no intention to transport troops to occupy Nihon, simply the letter ended with what could exist taken every bit a threat that he might if the island state did not submit equally a vassal.
When the shogunate passed the alphabetic character on to the royal court, which handled international diplomacy, the court decided to make no reply. The shogunate relayed this to the Yuan (Mongol) emissaries staying in the Kyūshū urban center of Dazaifu, and sent them home. However, Kublai connected to send emissaries, but the shogunate ignored them. Why did it reject diplomatic relations with the Yuan Dynasty?
Historian Arai Takashige writes, "The administrators of this fourth dimension knew almost nothing of international weather condition, and had close to zero experience of contact with other states. With this ignorance and inexperience, when they were faced with the alphabetic character, they must accept simply frozen. And their inexperience meant they were too unversed in diplomatic technique."
Certainly, if the government had been enlightened of the immense size of the Yuan territory and how much more than powerful the empire was than Nippon, it could non have ignored this. Just the shogunate got its data from Zen monks and their disciples from Southern Song, and information technology is non inconceivable that they might have downplayed the size of the Mongol Empire to protect their own interests, muddying the judgement of Japan's statesmen.
A Mismatch in Tactics
Impatient at the lack of response, Kublai sent an invasion armada carrying 30,000 troops (20,000 Mongol soldiers and 10,000 from Goryeo), which entered Hakata Bay on the dawn of November 26, 1274. Partly due to inadequate preparations, the disorganized shogunate soldiers on the scene allowed the Yuan forces to land without difficulty. In the battle that followed, the shogunate was at an overwhelming disadvantage, mainly due to the different tactics of the two forces. While the Kamakura samurai hoped to appoint in one-to-one horseback combat, the Yuan soldiers acted in groups.
As samurai approached the enemy to brand individual challenges, they were immediately surrounded and shot downward. In addition to the unsuitability of this grade of battle for the Japanese side, the Mongol soldiers' brusk bows had greater range than those of the Kamakura combatants and their arrows were tipped with toxicant, making even glancing hits fatal to the Japanese. Horses as well as soldiers came under assault.
Alongside the bedlam of gongs, the Yuan regular army deployed explosive projectiles. Gunpowder was withal unknown in Japan; the black shells that exploded midair, releasing burn and smoke, amazed Nihon's warriors and terrified its horses so that they could not fight. Nether such conditions, the shogunate had no option just to retreat, while the Yuan soldiers went back to spend the night on their ships.
Mōko shūrai ekotoba (Illustrated Story of the Mongol Invasions) is an account commissioned by the Kyūshū samurai Takezaki Suenaga, who fought in both of the battles. When the original (now held by the Purple Household Bureau) was found in the belatedly eighteenth century, it drew interest from daimyō and writers; many copies were made and around 40 are known to be extant. (Courtesy the National Nutrition Library)
The Vanished Ships
The following morning, however, the Yuan ships were nowhere to be seen. This brought to an end the kickoff Mongol invasion, known every bit the Battle of Bun'ei.
Many Japanese adults were taught in history classes that in both the Battle of Bun'ei and the Boxing of Kōan seven years later, the Yuan fleets were destroyed by heavy air current and rain. This was the kamikaze or "divine wind." The conventionalities that a divine wind would blow to save the country when Japan faced crisis led to the tragic events involving kamikaze pilots in Globe War II, but the idea dates back to the aftermath of the Mongol invasions.
Today's textbooks, withal, have significantly altered their presentation of the Battle of Bun'ei. Consider the following example from a Yamakawa Shuppansha publication.
"The Yuan force, which had xxx,000 soldiers including troops from Goryeo, attacked Tsushima and Iki before coming ashore in northern Kyūshū at Hakata Bay. . . . Used to one-on-one combat, the Japanese army struggled in the battle. However, the Yuan regular army also suffered considerable losses, as well as internal strife, earlier retreating. . . . In 1281, a huge army of 140,000 approached northern Kyūshū. Withal, while facing opposition to its landing at Hakata Bay, heavy air current and rain caused major casualties, and the Yuan forcefulness retreated once again."
Here "internal strife" is given every bit a reason for the Mongol retreat in 1274. How practice other textbooks compare? The respective textbook from Jikkyō Shuppan states that, "In the mixed army, morale was depression among the Yuan and Goryeo soldiers, who suffered heavy losses in the unfamiliar battle conditions before retreating."
Meanwhile a textbook from Tokyo Shoseki says that, "While the samurai struggled against the group tactics of the Yuan army, they as well inflicted many casualties, forcing the Yuan retreat."
Thus, the adverse atmospheric condition conditions that made the Yuan retreat have disappeared from these Japanese history textbooks. Information technology is fascinating to note that while Yamakawa gives the reason for withdrawal every bit internal strife, Jikkyō offers low morale and the unfamiliarity of battle conditions, while Tokyo Shoseki states that it is the efforts of the Japanese army. Each ane is different. Only in the Shimizu Shoin textbook does it say that, "At that moment, at that place was heavy wind and rain, and the invading army quickly retreated." Even here, though, there is no direct argument that the wind and rain was the decisive gene.
In other words, in that location is no generally accepted caption among historians every bit to why the Yuan army retreated. Kakehi Masahiro, a professor at Ferris University, offers an alternate theory. "For the Mongols, this was military reconnaissance, so they remained where they had landed, and never had any intention of continuing to fight."
There are also those scholars who withal call back that at that place was a draft. Hattori Hideo, a professor emeritus at Kyūshū University, writes in one of his books that there was heavy wind and rain, but the Yuan army did non retreat after simply one mean solar day.
Based on materials including the diary of the Kyoto noble Fujiwara no Kanenaka, Hattori asserts that the Mongol ground forces was in Japan for seven days before retreating due to a typhoon. He says that the typhoon is mentioned in Goryeo records. If this becomes the accustomed theory, Japanese textbooks may once more attribute the Mongol retreat to stormy weather.
Gratitude to the Gods
After the 1274 Battle of Bun'ei, the Yuan dynasty sent more emissaries to Nippon enervating allegiance, but the de facto leader of the shogunate Hōjō Tokimune had them all executed.
Kublai responded by sending an army of 140,000 to Japan in 1281. This included xxx,000 from eastern Yuan, mainly from Goryeo, and 100,000 from southern Cathay, including onetime Song troops. Even so, the Japanese side had learned from its previous experience, and was now well-versed in Yuan tactics. Its fortifications stretching for some xx kilometers helped the shogunate ground forces to preclude the huge Yuan army from coming aground.
The Japanese forces held on for effectually ii months until a large draft hitting Kyūshū on August 23. While the shogunate regular army suffered considerable casualties, all of the Yuan ships sank and their soldiers were lost beneath the waves.
In the case of the 1281 Battle of Kōan, scholars concur that a huge draft dealt a catastrophic blow to the Yuan ground forces. Both the court and the shogunate fabricated prayers afterward in thanks.
For example, Nijō Tameuji was dispatched past the majestic court to Ise Shrine, where he too visited a branch dedicated to a air current god within the Inner Shrine. A rumor circulated that this god had sent great gusts to aid the Japanese against the Mongols. In 1293, the court raised the condition of this shrine, naming it Kazahinomi-no-miya.
Other shrines also had their condition raised by the court, due to their supposed efficacy in the moment of crunch, including Hakozaki Hachimangū, Suwa Taisha, and Fuu Shrine. Every bit Nippon was thought to be a country of kami (native gods), the belief gradually spread that a kamikaze would protect the country in its fourth dimension of need.
Kublai planned to make a further attempt to invade Nippon, merely Mongol forces made slow progress in campaigns in Vietnam, faced repeated rebellions in Prc and Southeast Asia, and were driven out of Java in a failed incursion. In the end, there was no opportunity to endeavour again.
A Weakened Shogunate
Despite its success in keeping the invaders at bay, the Mongol attacks weakened the Kamakura shogunate. At the time, land gains funded rewards for battle participants, so with no new land the rewards paid by the shogunate were inadequate, peculiarly equally the samurai had paid necessary battle expenses themselves. Many died in battle, or were severely injured. Retainers nether the straight authority of the shogunate were economically dilapidated, and had to raise coin with their land equally collateral.
The Hōjō clan saw this as a run a risk to have over important posts with its own people in the name of emergency. Nonetheless, this led to a breakdown in loyalty, contributing to the fall of the shogunate in 1333.
Ghost of Tsushima, an action-run a risk game set at the fourth dimension of the Mongol invasions, has raised interest in this menses in Japanese history.
(Originally published in Japanese on November 12, 2021. Banner image: An analogy from Mōko shūrai ekotoba [Illustrated Story of the Mongol Invasions] shows gainsay at close quarters. Takezaki Suenaga charges at enemy soldiers. While the samurai wore armor, the Yuan soldiers were garbed in textile or leather. Courtesy the National Nutrition Library.)
Source: https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-topics/g01214/